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et al.: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW
I.

DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN AN ERISA-QuALIFIED PENSION PLAN
EXCLUDED FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

In Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore)1 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a debtor's bankruptcy estate does not include interests in a plan qualified under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 The court's decision conflicts with the
decisions of other circuit, district, and bankruptcy courts that have
considered this issue.
The trustee for the estates of several Chapter 7 debtors employed
by Springs Industries, Inc. (Springs) brought suit against the administrator of Springs' pension and profit-sharing plan (the Plan). The debtors participated in the Plan, which contained antiassignment provisions that prohibit the employees from alienating their interests in the
Plan. ERISA requires these provisions to qualify the Plan for tax-exempt status.8 The Plan also prohibited the distribution of vested interests to a beneficiary until after
retirement, disability, or termination of
4
services by the participant.
The bankruptcy trustee argued that the debtors' interests in the
Plan are property of the estate pursuant to section 541(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.5 This section broadly defines a debtor's estate as
"all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."" The administrator sought, however, to enforce the antialienation provisions of the Plan against the trustee. The
administrator based his argument on the exclusionary provision of section 541(c)(2), which provides that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title."7 Accordingly, the administrator argued that "the restrictions on

1.
2.
58, 104
3.
4.

907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. I 1989), as amended by Pub. L. No. 101Stat. 1388 (1990).
See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1477. The court noted that at the time of litigation "[t]he

debtors have thus far received no distribution under the plans and will not be eligible to
do so in the near future." Id.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).

6. Id.
7. Id. § 541(c)(2) (emphasis added).
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alienation of plan benefits in ERISA constitute 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' which operates under § 541(c)(2) to exclude the debtors'
interests in this ERISA-qualified plan from their bankruptcy estates." 8
The trustee challenged the administrator's position and argued
that the debtors' interests were not excludable because the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" refers only to plans with antialienation
provisions enforceable under state spendthrift trust law. The trustee
alleged that the Plan failed to qualify as a valid spendthrift trust
under South Carolina law. The trustee argued, therefore, that the
debtors' interests are not protected by section 541(c)(2) and are property of the debtors' estates.'
The bankruptcy court disagreed with the trustee and "held that
because the plan was ERISA-qualified, the interests in it were nonalienable and thus were excluded from the bankruptcy estates and not
subject to turnover to the trustee."1 ° The district court affirmed. The
trustee appealed the judgment of the district court. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed."In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit addressed two issues.
First, the court determined the meaning of the term "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." Second, the court decided whether ERISA's
transfer restriction brings ERISA within the meaning of the term.
With respect to the definition of the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the court had two choices: adopt the trustee's narrow interpretation that limits section 541(c)(2)'s application to state spendthrift trust law or accept the administrator's broader interpretation.
The Anderson court adopted the broader interpretation and reasoned
that "'[a]pplicable nonbankruptcy law' means precisely what it says:
all laws, state and federal, under which a transfer restriction is enforceable. Nothing in the phrase. . . or in the remainder of § 541(c)(2) suggests that the phrase refers
exclusively to state law, much less to state
2
spendthrift trust law."1

The court reached its decision, in part, by looking to other Bankruptcy Code sections in which the term "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" is used. The court observed that interpretations of the term in
other sections encompass both state and federal law.'3 The court then
concluded that "'a word is presumed to have the same meaning in all
subsections of the same statute.' " 4 Additionally, the court relied on

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1477 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1481.
Id. at 1477.
Id. at 1477-78.
Id. at 1478 (quoting Morrison-Knudson Constr. Co. v. Director, Office of Work-
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its decision in McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund.15
Although the McLean court did not decide whether ERISA is "applicable nonbankruptcy law," it "rejected the contention that '§
541(c)(2) should be confined in its recognition of enforceable transfer
restrictions to those found in "traditional" spendthrift trusts.' "16 The
court also reasoned that if courts rely solely upon state spendthrift
trust law, states that fail to recognize state spendthrift trusts could
completely disregard the ERISA antialienation provisions. This result
is contrary
to Congress's intent that ERISA completely pre-empt state
17
law.
After defining the scope of "applicable nonbankruptcy law," the
Anderson court determined "whether ERISA contains an enforceable
transfer restriction that would bring [ERISA] within the meaning of
the term 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' in § 541(c)(2)."' 8 In answering
this question affirmatively, the court focused on its interpretation of
both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code and attempted to give full effect to both statutes.1 9 The Bankruptcy Code broadly defines an estate
in bankruptcy to include "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case. ' 20 In contrast, ERISA
requires plans to include provisions that prohibit the alienation of interests in the plans before they qualify under ERISA.21 Additionally,
the Internal Revenue Code and the accompanying Treasury Regulations contain assignment restrictions.22 Thus, if a court includes the
debtor's interest in a plan in the bankruptcy estate, compliance with
all of these statutes is impossible. 28 Accordingly, the court determined

ers' Compensation Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 633 (1983)).
15. 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
16. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1478 (quoting McLean, 762 F.2d at 1207 n.1).
17. Id. at 1480 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)). Section 1144(a) provides, with
some exceptions, that "this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
18. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1479.
19. Id. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court stated, "The courts are
not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co.existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective." Id. at 551.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
21. Section 1056(d)(1) of ERISA states, "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)

(1988).
22. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1480 (discussing the relevant portions of the Internal
Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations).
23. See Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as
to Whether a Debtor's Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can Be Used to
Pay Claims? (pt. 2), 61 AM. BANK L.J. 301, 317 (1987).
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that it could "best harmonize ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code, and the
Internal Revenue2 Code by reading 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' to
include ERISA." 4
The Anderson court also recognized that its holding prevents general creditors from circumventing a plan's antiassignment restrictions
by forcing a debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. 25 Moreover, if the An-

derson court had approved a violation of the antialienation provision
by allowing turnover of a single debtor's interest, the entire Plan would
have lost its tax-exempt status. 26 Disqualification of a plan's tax-exempt status affects not only the debtor, but also employers, other plan
participants, and the trust itself.27 Finally, the Anderson court recog-

nized that its decision to construe ERISA as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" furthered ERISA's policy of protecting a worker's defined
retirement benefits. 28
Decisions from other jurisdictions differ on the interpretation of
section 541(c)(2)'s exclusionary provision. A minority of decisions use
reasoning similar to the Anderson court's and hold that ERISA constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law."2 9 However, a greater number of
circuit, district, and bankruptcy courts focus on state spendthrift trust
law when applying section 541(c)(2) to retirement plans.2 0

24. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1481 (citation omitted). The court's holding is one of

three potential resolutions of this issue. Seiden, supra note 23, at 317-19. Once the court
decided the issue, it noted that it did not need to "reach the question whether the plan
constitutes a spendthrift trust under South Carolina law." Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1477.
25. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1480.
26. Id. at 1480-81. The Internal Revenue Service has expressly stated that a plan
will lose its tax-exempt status if the plan administrator turns over the assets of the plan
to the bankruptcy trustee. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-11-037 (Dec. 20, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
89-51-067 (Sept. 28, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035.
27. Seiden, supra note 23, at 333-34.
28. Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1479-80.
29. Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991) (expressly following
Anderson approach); Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1478 (citing Liscinski v. Mosely (In re Mosley), 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips),
34 Bankr. 543 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Clotfelter v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. (In re Threewitt),
24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982)). But see In re Lee, 119 Bankr. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (expressly rejecting the Anderson approach); In re Martin, 119 Bankr. 297 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990) (expressly rejecting the Anderson approach).
30. See, e.g., In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1990); Humphrey v. Buckley (In
re Swanson), 873 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989); Brooks v. Interfirst Bank (In re Brooks), 844
F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re
Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982); see
also Seiden, supra note 23, at 245-54 (providing an excellent discussion of the decisions
that focus on state spendthrift trust law when deciding whether to exclude from the
bankruptcy estate a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan).
Even if a court limits the application of section 541(c)(2) to state spendthrift trust
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Section 541(c)(2) does not mention state spendthrift trust law.
Consequently, many of the courts that follow the spendthrift trust theory support their position with the legislative reports that accompany
section 541(c)(2).I l The legislative history arguably establishes Congressional intent that section 541(c)(2) applies only to antialienation
provisions enforceable under state spendthrift trust law. The Anderson
court concluded, however, that because the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, the legislative history is irrelevant.32
The Anderson court's broad reading of section 541(c)(2) was
proper. This interpretation harmonizes the potential conflicts between
the Bankruptcy Code, ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, and the
Treasury Regulations and avoids a potential conflict with the pre-emption provisions of ERISA. Although it may appear inequitable to bar a
debtor's assets from creditors, these inequities are outweighed by the
adverse effects a different result would have on innocent plan participants. The Anderson court recognized and resolved these problems,
but deepened the split between circuits on this issue. Until the Supreme Court decides the issue, however, the law in the Fourth Circuit
is clear: pursuant to section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualifled plan is excluded from that
debtor's bankruptcy estate.
William G. Lyles, III
II. FOURTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETS THE SUBSEQUENT ADVANCE RULE OF
BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 547(c)(4) TO ALLOW SETOFF AGAINST
PRIOR PREFERENTIAL PAYMENTS

ALL

In Crichton v. Wheeling National Bank (In re Meredith Manor,
Inc.)33 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted section
547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code3 to allow a creditor to setoff advances to the debtor not only against an immediately preceding preferential payment but also against all prior preferential payments.3 5 Thus,
a bankruptcy trustee must calculate the amount recoverable as preferlaw, a debtor could argue

that an ERISA-qualified plan meets the requirements of the
state law. However, ERISA plans usually do not meet the rigid requirements of a valid
state spendthrift trust. For example, the settlor may be the beneficiary, the plan may
contain certain loan or withdrawal provisions, or the settlor may have absolute domain

over the trust. See, e.g., Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d at 1490.
31. See Anderson, 907 F.2d at 1478-79.
32. Id. (citing Davis v. Michigan Dep't of the Tress., 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989)).
33. 902 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1990).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (1988).
35. Crichton, 902 F.2d at 259.
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ences by determining the difference between total preferences and total advances, provided that each advance is used to offset only prior
preferences.3
"[S]ection 547(c)(4) is Congress' solution for the running account
creditor" 37 and prohibits the trustee from recovering a preference if
"(1) the creditor extended new value to or for the benefit of the debtor,
(2) that new value was unsecured, (3) the extension induced an 'otherwise unavoidable transfer' from debtor to creditor, and (4) the extension occurred 'after such transfer.' "38 The Crichton decision interpreted the meaning of the fourth requirement and is significant for two
reasons: consistent with other circuits, the Fourth Circuit implicitly rejected the view that section 547(c)(4) codifies the net result rule,'39 and
the Fourth Circuit squarely addressed whether section 547(c)(4) allows
a creditor to carry forward a debtor's preferential payments until exhausted by subsequent advances to the debtor.
In Crichton the debtors obtained a $200,000 line of credit from
Wheeling National Bank in May 1985. As security, the debtors granted
the Bank a security interest in all current and after acquired accounts
receivable and in student contracts arising from the debtors' operation
of a horsemanship school. 40 In mid-November 1985 the creditors called
debtors filed petithe line of credit, and on November 21, 1985, the
41
tions under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In the bankruptcy court proceeding the trustee requested that the
court allow him to recover, as preferential payments, all loan repayments the debtors made to the Bank during the ninety days preceding
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.42 The Bank conceded that the

payments it received from the debtors were preferential transfers

36. Id. Under the Bankruptcy Code a trustee may recover a transfer to a creditor
that meets the voidable preference requirements defined in section 547(b). 11 U.S.C. §
547(b) (1988). The trustee may not, however, avoid such a transfer if a section 547(c)
exception applies. Id. § 547(c). Congress enacted section 547(c)(4) to "remove[] the unfairness of allowing the trustee to void all transfers made by the debtor to a creditor
during the preference period without giving the creditor any corresponding credits for

subsequent advances of new value to the debtor's estate." 4

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

§

547.12, at 56 (15th ed. 1990).
37. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 36, at 57.
38. Comment, The Running-Account Creditor and Section 547(c)(4) of the New
Bankruptcy Code, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 959, 962 (1980).

39. According to the Ninth Circuit, "lt]he net result rule was a judicial creation
under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. It provided that if there was a running account of credit

and payment between debtor and creditor, all transactions over the preference period
were examined." McClendon v. Cal-Wood Door (In re Wadsworth Bldg. Components,
Inc.), 711 F.2d 122, 123 (9th Cir. 1983); see Comment, supra note 38, at 967-68.
40. Crichton, 902 F.2d at 257.

41. Id. at 258.
42. Id.
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under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 3 The Bank argued,
however, that section 547(c)(4) codified the net result rule and that the
trustee was, therefore, entitled to recover only $31,705.28 of the
$121,659.61 in total payments received from the debtor because the
Bank made advances to the debtor totaling $89,954.33 during the same
period. 4" The bankruptcy court rejected the Bank's argument and held
that in "[a]pplying the procedure set forth in Section 547(c)(4), each
transfer by a debtor within the 90-day pre-petition preference period
must be netted against the value of advances made to the debtor after
45
that transfer but before the next transfer.'
On appeal the district court rejected both the Bank's and the
bankruptcy court's interpretation of section 547(c)(4) and held that all
preferential payments made by a debtor prior to an advance may be
carried forward until exhausted and netted against the value of subsequent advances.46 Thus, the district court adopted the approach set
forth in Thomas W. Garland,Inc. v. Union Electric Co. (In re Thomas
W. Garland,Inc.)47 and rejected the approach subsequently articulated
in Leathers v. Prime Leather Finishes Co.48 on which the bankruptcy
court relied. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court and adopted the Garland rule as the proper interpretation of
section 547(c)(4).' 9
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Garland rule better serves
the legislative goal of encouraging creditors to assist financially troubSOUTH CAROLINA LAw REVIEW

43. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).

44. Wheeling Nat'l Bank v. Meredith (In re Meredith Manor, Inc.), Ch. 7 Case No.
85-40149, Adv. No. 87-0097, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. Feb. 27, 1989), vacated and
remanded, 103 Bankr. 118 (S.D.W. Va. 1989), aff'd sub noma. Crichton v. Wheeling Nat'l
Bank (In re Meredith Manor, Inc.), 902 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1990).

45. Id. at 8.
46. Wheeling Nat'l Bank v. Meredith (In re Meredith Manor, Inc.), 103 Bankr. 118
(S.D.W. Va. 1989), aff'd sub nor. Crichton v. Wheeling Nat'l Bank (In re Meredith
Manor, Inc.), 902 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1990).
47. 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
48, 40 Bankr. 248 (D. Me. 1984). In comparing the various interpretations of section

547(c)(4), the district court stated:
The difference between the Garland and Leathers methods is that Leathers
limits the preferential payment carry forward while Garland does not. In Gar-

land, the creditor is entitled to a dollar-for-dollar offset up to the date of bank-

ruptcy, regardless of intervening payments. Leathers, on the other hand, places
extreme emphasis on each individual preferential payment and affords dollar-

for-dollar protection only for advancements made between payments. Unlike
the net result rule, both methods require the preferential payment precede the

offsetting advancement for the creditor to be entitled to a set off.
Meredith, 103 Bankr. at 120.

49. Crichton, 902 F.2d at 259.
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led debtors and reflects a more realistic view of commercial practices. 0
A creditor does not extend credit based upon any single payment. Instead, a creditor analyzes "the debtors' entire financial picture and repayment history, not the latest payment," 51 when extending credit.
The Fourth Circuit's implicit holding that section 547(c)(4) does
not codify the judicially created net result rule is consistent with other
circuits' holdings, 52 many lower court opinions, 5 and other commentators.5 4 Section 547(c)(4) is now known by most courts as the subse-

quent advance rule.55 Courts have differed, however, in their interpretations of this rule, with some adopting a form57 of the Garland rule56
and one adopting a form of the Leathers rule.
In Valley Candle Manufacturing Co. v. Stonitsch (In re Isis
Foods, Inc.)58 the court attempted to reconcile Garland and Leathers.
It argued that courts should limit the Garland holding to the facts of
that case. 59 In Garland the court allowed the creditor to setoff an advance of credit against the total of three preferential payments made
on the same day without intervening extensions of credit. 60 The
Stonisch court noted that the Leathers court allowed the creditor to

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. New York City Shoes v. Bentley Int'l (In re New York City Shoes), 880 F.2d
679, 680 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1986); McClendon v.
Cal-Wood Door (In re Wadsworth Bldg. Components, Inc.), 711 F.2d 122, 123-24 (9th
Cir. 1983); Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 706 F.2d 171, 173-74
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983), on remand, 45 Bankr. 112 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1984), aff'd, 78 Bankr. 146 (M.D. Tenn. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 872 F.2d
739 (6th Cir. 1989); Gold Coast Seed Co. v. Spokane Seed Co. (In re Gold Coast Seed
Co.), 30 Bankr. 551, 552-53 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).
53. Eisenberg v. 0. Censor & Co. (In re Baurngold Bros., Inc.), 103 Bankr. 436, 439
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); Riezman v. Phillips Petroleum Co. (In re Telecommunication
Servs., Inc.), 55 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985); Leathers v. Prime Leather Finishes
Co., 40 Bankr. 248, 250-51 (D. Me. 1984); Valley Candle Mfg. Co. v. Stonitsch (In re Isis
Foods, Inc.), 39 Bankr. 645, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Union
Elec. Co. (In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.), 19 Bankr. 920, 925-26 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1982); Pettigrew v. Trust Co. Bank (In re Bishop), 17 Bankr. 180, 185 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1982).
54. 4 COLLmR ON BANkRuprcy, supra note 36, at 57-58; Comment, supra note 38, at
959.
55. Prescott, 805 F.2d at 728; Waldschmidt, 706 F.2d at 172-73; Eisenberg, 103
Bankr. at 439; Leathers, 40 Bankr. at 250; Stonitsch, 39 Bankr. at 649.
56. Eisenberg, 103 Bankr. at 440; see Waldschmidt, 706 F.2d at 173-74.
57. Stonitsch, 39 Bankr. at 649-52.
§8. 39 Bankr. 645 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
59. Id. at 650.
60. Garland,19 Bankr. at 929. The credit exceeded the three payments made on the
same day; therefore, the court allowed the creditors to retain all three payments pursuant to section 547(c)(4). Id.
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setoff the total value of two extensions of credit made without an intervening preferential payment against the total amount of several checks
received during the period prior to the two extensions of credit.6 1 The
court implied that Garland did not contemplate allowing creditors to
carry forward preferential payments in excess of a subsequent extension of credit. Therefore, the court adopted the Leathers rule as consistent with the construction of section 547(c)(4). Thus, the Fourth
Circuit's reliance on the Garland rule may be unjustified.
Although the Garland holding did not present the factual situation addressed by the Fourth Circuit, the underlying rationale of Garland supports the Fourth Circuit's opinion. In Garlandthe court noted
that "[a]n acknowledgement of the net result rule in the legislative history serves to emphasize that the drafters of the Code were attempting
to retain at least the principles behind the rule in section 547(c)(4) and
to recognize the realities of ordinary business transactions. '62 Garland's rationale supports the view that only one difference exists between section 547(c)(4)'s subsequent advance rule and the net result
rule: only advances made subsequent to a preference may be used to
offset a trustee's avoidance powers. This view would support carrying
6 3
forward preferential payments until exhausted.
The Fourth Circuit's approach also is consistent with section
547(c)(4)'s purpose of "encourag[ing] trade creditors to continue dealing with troubled businesses '6 4 while simultaneously promoting equality of treatment among creditors. If section 547(c)(4) does not allow a
creditor "to set off subsequent new value against a net balance of all
prior preferences, there would be little incentive for [the creditor] to
continue [advancing] any new value to the debtor in excess of the immediately preceding payment, regardless of the amount of prior payments by the debtor."6 5 However, if section 547(c)(4) allows a creditor

61. Stonitsch, 39 Bankr. at 651.
62. Garland, 19 Bankr. at 926. The legislative history of section 547(c)(4) provides:
"The fourth exception codifies the net result rule in section 60c of current law. If the

creditor and the debtor have more than one exchange during the 90-day period, the exchanges are netted out according to the formula in paragraph (4)." H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1977), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5963, 6330; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5874.

63. The rule articulated by the Fourth Circuit is a modified net result rule. Like the
net result rule, a creditor may carry forward preferential payments until exhausted
against subsequent advances. Unlike the net result rule, a creditor may not use a prior
advance to offset a subsequent preferential payment.
64. Gold Coast Seed Co. v. Spokane Seed Co. (In re Gold Coast Seed Co.), 30
Bankr. 551, 553 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983).

65. Eisenberg v. 0. Censor & Co. (In re Baumgold Bros., Inc.), 103 Bankr. 436, 440
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). An example illustrates the absurd results the Leathers approach
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to apply the net result rule, one creditor may prejudice other unsecured creditors by colluding with the debtor when bankruptcy is imminent."8 If a creditor has an unused balance of new value, "[t]he netresult rule allows the debtor to make a payment to the creditor in an
amount equal to the unused balance of new value, thereby preventing
the trustee from recovering that amount. 6 7 This result reduces the
funds available for distribution to the unsecured creditors.68 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's approach prevents this abuse by requiring
the debtor's payment to precede the new value.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's approach is consistent with the
plain meaning of section 547(c)(4).69 An interpretation that would not
allow a creditor to carry forward preferential payments and set them
off against subsequent advances "places limitations '70on the creditor's
right of set off not found in the statutory language.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of section 547(c)(4) represents
a compromise, supported by the plain meaning of the statutory language, that best encourages creditors to assist financially troubled
debtors without prejudicing other unsecured creditors. Moreover, the
practical significance of the Fourth Circuit's holding is two-fold: Under
section 547(c)(4) creditors may not rely on an extension of credit prior
to a preferential payment to circumvent the trustee's avoidance powers, and creditors may carry forward, until exhausted, preferential payments made by debtors.
Perry Mason Hogue, Jr.

could produce. Suppose that the creditor satisfied all other requirements of section
547(c)(4). Ten days prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the debtor made a preferential
payment to the creditor of $200,000; nine days prior, the creditor advanced the debtor
$10,000; eight days prior, the debtor made another preferential payment of $10,000; and
seven days prior, the creditor advanced $200,000. Under the Leathers rule, the trustee

could avoid $190,000. Under the Fourth Circuit's view, the creditor would carry forward
the excess $190,000 in preferential payments after the first subsequent advance. The
creditor would net the second subsequent advance against the $190,000 carry forward
plus the additional payment of $10,000, and the trustee could not avoid either payment.

The Leathers rule would encourage the creditor to make a second advance of only
$10,000.
66. Comment, supra note 38, at 973.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 972.
70. Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co. (In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc.), 19

Bankr. 920, 926 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
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